Judicial control of arbitral awards

The Supreme Court has recently made public two identical decisions[1] whereby it rejected the appeals filed against arbitral awards made by the Permanent Arbitration Panel of the Buenos Aires Stock Exchange seeking their review before the courts.

In both decisions the Supreme Court succinctly ruled that, the parties having waived in advance their power to appeal the arbitral awards, the only way such awards could be judicially reviewed was through the setting aside provisions of Section 760 of the National Procedural Code for Civil and Commercial Matters.

Although concise, these new decisions characterize the judicial control of arbitral awards as an exception to the internationally accepted principle of their binding and final nature.

In previous editions of this publication it has been noted that the “Cartellone” doctrine – followed in only a few other cases[2] – and according to which the judicial review of arbitral awards can be sought not only pursuant to the setting aside provisions of Section 760 of the Procedural Code but also when the award is unconstitutional, illegal or unreasonable, was applied only with respect to awards made by the Public Works Arbitration Panel created by Law No 13,064.

Through its two latest decisions the Supreme Court confirms the limited scope of its “Cartellone“ doctrine.

Accordingly, the current Supreme Court’s case law on the matter of the scope of the judicial control of arbitral awards is divided between, on the one hand, the general principle followed in cases ruled by the setting aside provisions of the Procedural Code and, on the other hand, the exceptions where the Supreme Court admitted different annulment grounds to those provided by the Procedural Code with respect to awards made by the Public Works’ Arbitration Panel only.[3]

The Supreme Court has the last word on this matter. Its future decisions will (or will not) clarify the position.